

D E F E N C E

O F T H E

A Case Fairly Stated,

Against a late Pamphlet, intituled, *Truth
against Craft, or Sophistry and Fal-
shood Detected.*

By the Author of *The Case Fairly Stated.*



D U B L I N :

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


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DEFENCE

OF THE

Case fairly Stated, &c.



THE Author of *the Case fairly Stated*, having observed with great Concern, the Endeavours that were used to spread a Spirit of Jealousy and Discontent among the People of this Kingdom, as if the Clause sent over by his Majesty, with the Advice of his Privy Council in *Great-Britain*, was designed to strike at our fundamental Liberties, thought he could not more effectually serve his King and Country, than by endeavouring to clear his Majesty's Government from so odious an Aspersion. He was in hope his Design would have been approved by those that have the Tranquillity of this Country really at heart. And he has had the Satisfaction to find, that his Endeavours have not been altogether unacceptable to many Persons for whose Judgment he has a great Regard.

But it seems there are still many, who appear to be uneasy at any Attempts that are made to calm the Ferment that has been raised in the Spirits of the People. They are still resolved to use their utmost Efforts to persuade them that their fundamental Liberties were in Danger; that the Administration was engaged in a Design to subvert the Constitution; and that the Clause was a deep-laid Scheme to effect that Design.

The Author of the Pamphlet, entitled, *Truth against Craft, or Sophistry and Falshood detected*, hath distinguished himself this Way. The manifest Tendency of his whole Pamphlet is, as far as his Influence goes, to persuade the People, that there was a dangerous Design formed for subverting the Privileges of Parliament, and the Liberties of the People. The Bitterness and Passion with which he writes, discovers itself in the Title he hath prefixed to it, nor has he suffered his Spirit to cool through a tedious Pamphlet of eighty six Pages.

The Method which the Author of *the Case fairly stated* took, was this. He endeavoured to state the true Design of the Clause against which so great a Clamour has been raised: To shew what that Prerogative was, which the Clause was intended to assert; that there is Reason to think this Prerogative is well founded; and that the Clause was well fitted to assert that Prerogative. After which, it was argued, that the Clause had nothing in it inconsistent with the undoubted Privileges of Parliament, or the Liberties of the People; and that, if it had passed, it could not by any just Construction, have proved destructive to those Liberties and Privileges. This Method seemed to him fair and clear, and fitted to bring the Matter to a proper Issue. For if the Prerogative is really such, as the Author of the Case represented it, and if the Clause relating to the

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Previous Consent was well fitted to answer that Prerogative, and at the same time had nothing in it that tended to subvert our Liberties; if all this be proved, the main end of the Pamphlet is obtained: And there is no sufficient Reason for those Jealousies and Clamour that have been so industriously fomented and propagated.

The angry Gentleman who has undertaken to answer the Case, has not thought fit to attempt to prove, either that the King hath not that Prerogative which is ascribed to him; or that the Clause was not proper to assert that Prerogative; nor has he answered what was offered to shew, that the Clause neither in express Words, nor by fair Implication, tended to destroy the Privileges of Parliament, or the Liberties of the People. What is it then that he has attempted to prove? He has endeavoured from other Considerations to shew, that those who were for bringing in the Clause had an ill Intention against our Liberties. He refers to the Debates in Parliament, for judging of the real Intention of the Clause, and intimates, that the Author of the *Case*, being a Person that spends most of his time in his Closet, and not having attended these Debates, could not be a proper Judge of the Meaning of it. But very probably, there are judicious Persons, who will be of a different Opinion from our Author in this Matter. Supposing what he insinuates concerning the Author of the *Case* to be true, his spending much of his Time in his Closet would no way disqualify him from judging of the Nature and Intention of the Clause, when it came to be laid before the Public. And perhaps, a Man that has absolutely kept himself from being engaged in the Bustle and Tumult of Party, and who without any Connections, Interests, or Prepossessions of any kind to influence him, endeavoured to form an impartial Judgment,

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by considering the Reason of the Case, and deliberately weighing and comparing Things to the best of his Capacity, might be able to pass a juster, because a more cool and unprejudiced Judgment, than Persons of much superior Abilities, whose Affections were engaged, and whose Connections and Attachments might cast a Byass upon their Minds.

Every one that has either personally attended the Debates in Parliament, or read an Account of them when published, must be sensible that many Things are said in the Course of a Debate, and in the Heat of Argument, which will by no means bear a cool Examination. Men that are eager for carrying a Question are apt to seek out for every Thing that has the Appearance of an Argument to support it; and they that oppose it are equally zealous to load it with ill Consequences, and to urge every Thing that has the Colour of a Reason for justifying their Opposition. Great and able Speakers, especially if they happen to be at the same Time very popular in their Country, have often a mighty Influence in leading Public Assemblies. For these and other Reasons, it is sometimes no easy Matter to form a true Judgment of the real Sense and Intention of a Law, by what is said in Parliament for or against it. Nor do any of the Courts afterwards, in judging of the Sense of a Law, think themselves obliged to inquire into the particular Debates that were carried on in Parliament relating to it. They judge of the Intention by the Words of the Law itself, or by what may be looked upon to be fairly implied, and do not admit any Thing to be the Sense of that Law, but what is clearly expressed in the Words of it, or may by just and natural Consequence be deduced from it. If therefore the so much contested Clause has nothing in it, which either by express Words,

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or by fair Implication is subversive of our Liberties, the Clause is so far justified: The passing of it could not have produced the dangerous Consequences that many have apprehended: And there is no sufficient Ground for the loud Clamours which have been raised against it, as if it struck at the Foundation of our Liberties. This is what the Author of the *Case fairly Stated*, has endeavoured particularly to shew. Nor has his Answerer taken the least Notice of that Part of the Pamphlet, or shewn that he was wrong in his Reasoning on the Clause. He indeed in many Words, and with abundance of Heat, charges those in the Administration, as having intended by that Clause to preclude the Parliament from the Liberty of ever so much as giving their Advice to his Majesty, with Relation to the Application of any Part of the unappropriated Money in the Treasury, or of ever calling his Majesty's Servants to an Account. But he makes not the least attempt to shew, that there was any Thing in the Clause itself declarative of that ill Intention; or that what he Charges upon the Clause is either contained in it, in-express Words, or may by just Consequence be deduced from it. If therefore the Clause had passed, there was nothing in it either to preclude the Parliament from giving their Advice to his Majesty in any future Time, or from calling his Servants to an Account for an Embezzlement or Misapplication of the Public Money, or that could in any Respect abridge the Parliament of their essential Rights, or the People of their Liberties. If there had, our Author would not have failed to have shewn it, since nobody can suppose he wanted Inclination, and I will do him the Justice to say, that neither did he want Abilities for that Purpose.

The principal Thing he insisteth upon is, that *it is a Thing past all Doubt*, that the Sense which he has put upon the Clause is the *very Sense in which the Clause was universally understood by the House of Commons in the Day of the Debate.* p. 21, 22. That the House of Commons rejected the Clause is certain, and that therefore they thought proper to reject it. So far any Man is safe in declaring the Sense of the House. But as to the particular Grounds upon which they rejected it, or the Sense in which they understood the Clause; no Man has a Right to take upon him positively to declare it, except that Sense plainly ariseth from the Words themselves, or except the House should make an authentic Declaration concerning it. Though the Majority concurred in rejecting the Clause, no Man, not even though he were a Member of that Honourable House, can prove that they all did it on the same Grounds, or that they all regarded it in the same Light. There might probably be among them different Sentiments and Views. How can this Writer be sure, though he affirms that it is *past all Doubt*, that all those who rejected the Clause, *universally understood* it precisely in that Sense which he has thought fit to put upon it, as precluding the Parliament from ever giving Advice to his Majesty with Regard to the Application of the Money in the Treasury, or from calling his Servants to an Account for any Misapplication of it? Might not some of them, without regarding it in either of these Views, be for rejecting it, as tending in their Opinion, to establish a Precedent concerning the not bringing in *a Bill* for the Application of the unappropriated Money in the Treasury, without the King's previous Consent; which they might look upon as an Incroachment upon the Privileges of the Commons? How then will he prove that his
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own Sense of the Clause was universally the Sense of the House? Will he refer us to the Speeches that were made against the Clause, and lay it down as a Principle, that the Sense put upon the Clause by the Gentlemen who opposed it, and had a Mind to raise prejudices against it, was the true and genuine Sense of the Clause? If this Principle be denied or contested, as it reasonably may, then the whole of his Reasoning, which, according to his Art of multiplying Words, takes up many Pages, falls to the Ground. Can this Writer be sure, that no Considerations whatsoever, distinct from the proper Point in Question, had any the least Influence in the Endeavours that were used to render the Clause odious, or occasioned its being represented in worse Colours than the Words will naturally bear? Has not he himself taken Notice of the *Indignation conceived at the thoughts of a Primate, and a transient Minister's transient Secretary, acquiring the principal Direction of the Interests of this Country?* Supplement to the Remarks, p. 17. Has not he expressly spoken of a *Struggle* carried on upon this Occasion, and taken upon him to represent the opposing and controuling their Power as *the sole Object the Commons had in View?* Rem. Num. iv. p. 46. But without pretending to carry it so far as this Writer has done, is it not possible that Prejudices of this Nature, whether well-founded or not is not my Business to examine, may have had some Influence on the Debates? Is there any thing in this, but what may be expected from Human Nature, even as it is to be found in the greatest and ablest Men?

It cannot be denied, that in a former Session that very Clause was passed, which has now been rejected. This shews, they did not, as he would persuade us, *universally understand* it in the Light he is pleased to represent it in. For I am satisfied, if there

had been a Bill brought into the House, in the Preamble of which it was declared, that the Commons had no Right so much as to advise his Majesty with Regard to the Application of the Public Money remaining in the Treasury, or to call his Servants to an Account, it could never have passed in that or any other Session. And I have too great a Regard for that Honourable House, and those who are looked upon as the leading Members of it, to believe they would upon any Consideration have passed it, if they had regarded it as equivalent to such a Declaration. And indeed sad would be our Case, if the Operation of the Clause were to be such as he represents it, to deprive the Commons and People of their essential Rights and Liberties. For this very Clause has actually passed into a Law, which has received the Sanction of the whole Legislature, and is now to be found, as our Author owns, in the *List of our Statutes*, Rem. Num. iv. P. 47.

Let us put the Case, which was very possible, that the same Clause had passed again in this Session, as it had done in a former, two Years before. Can any Man imagine that the Commons would have acknowledged that it abridged them of their Right to advise his Majesty with Regard to the Application of the Public Money, or to call his Servants to an Account for the Embezzlement of it? I am persuaded they would never have allowed this to be the natural Sense of that Clause; and any Minister that should argue from it in any future Time for depriving them of those Rights would render himself ridiculous as well as odious.

The Author of *Truth against Craft*, has made another Attempt to shew that the Intention of the Clause was such as he represents it; and that is, that this was the Sense in which it was intended by those

those that favoured the Clause as well as by those that opposed it. He expressly says, "It has been proved in the Course of this Paper, that the Gentlemen, or at least, the Leaders of the Gentlemen who voted for passing the Clause, understood the Clause in the very same Sense with the Patriot Majority, by whose Votes the Clause was rejected." P. 39. *i. e.* as he takes upon him to explain their Sense, they understood it as containing a Declaration, or at least as manifestly implying, that the Commons were never without his Majesty's previous Consent, so much as to give their Advice, and consequently not so much as to address him with Relation to the Application of the unappropriated Money lying in the Treasury, nor ever to call his Servants to an Account for a Misapplication of it. But it is very probable, that the Gentlemen, whose Sentiments he takes upon him to explain, will not allow this to be a fair Representation of them. Will he undertake to prove, that it was declared in the House, by any Person, who were authorised to declare the Sense of the Government, that this was the Sense intended by the Clause? This is a Charge of a very heinous Nature, and ought not to be advanced, except it can be well supported.

These are the principal Things our Author has offered, to shew that the Clause was intended to subvert our Fundamental Liberties. But he has made no Attempt to prove that the Expressions of that Clause naturally lead to the Sense he would put upon them. And if they do not, then by his own Concession the Operation of the Clause, if it had passed, could not have been to abridge the Commons of their Privileges, or the People of their Liberties. For he himself has expressly asserted, that "the Rights of Parliament are not capable of be-

“ ing affected by Implication, or taken away but
 “ by clear Words in an Act of Parliament, or
 “ exprefs Concessions from the Representatives of
 “ the People.” *Rem. Num. iii. p. 4.*

This Writer frequently talks of the Absurdity of taking Words in what he calls their *Abstract Signification*. But he should have taken this along with him, that the Author of the Case does not merely consider the Words of the Clause, in their strict literal Meaning, as abstracted from all Regard to their Connection; but he considers what Sense they will bear, not only in exprefs Words, but by fair Implication, and has shewn that thus considered they do not lead to the Sense this Gentleman is for taking them in. This is what he is pleased to take no Notice of. As to his Observation therefore, with Regard to the Advantage this would give to the Deists, p. 23. this is nothing to his Purpose, except he should think proper to grant that our Saviour's Expressions, both literally taken and by just Implication, contain the absurd Sense the Deists would put upon them; and that Man would certainly be a very bad Defender of the Christian Cause that should acknowledge this.

There is one Passage more relating to this matter, which deserves our notice. It is in p. 6. where he has thought fit to compare the Attempt of the Author of the Case to a Man that should assert “ at
 “ this Time of Day, that the Debates of the Synod
 “ of *Dort* did not relate to the antecedent Predesti-
 “ nation and sovereign Decrees of God, but was
 “ wholly reducible to this harmless Question, whe-
 “ ther it was not decent and proper for Men to make
 “ Acknowledgments to their Maker by the Favour
 “ of whose Providence our Tables are covered, and
 “ we are enabled to relish and enjoy the Fruits of
 “ our own Labours.” This Gentleman could not
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have chosen a more unhappy Instance for his Purpose. What render'd the Decrees of that Synod so unacceptable to the Remonstrants, was that in express Words, as well as by plain and evident Implication, they established Doctrines which the Remonstrants believed to be false. But if the Decrees of that Synod had contained nothing in them relating to the controverted Doctrines, or had not determined these Doctrines at all, either in express Words or by plain Implication, no body can doubt that those who so warmly opposed that Synod and it's Decrees, would have dropped their Opposition, and would have found no Difficulty in subscribing those Decrees; even though it should have been pretended that the Leaders of that Synod were no Friends to them or to their Cause. Now to apply this to the present Question: If the Clause sent over from *Great-Britain* had in express Words, or by clear and evident Consequence, contained a Declaration that the Parliament should never be permitted without the King's previous Consent so much as to give his Majesty any Advice relating to the Application of any part of the unappropriated Money in the Treasury; and that they should never be allowed to call his Majesty's Servants to an Account concerning the Disposal of the public Money; if a Clause of this Nature had been proposed, determining these Things in as express Terms as the Decrees of the Synod of *Dort* have determined the five famous controverted Points, this would undoubtedly be a very good Reason for rejecting it. But if the Clause contained nothing in it of this kind, either in express Words, or that could be deduced from it by clear Consequence, then according to this Parallel it might have been passed and agreed to in a Consistency with the Preservation of those important Interests and Priviledges: as the Decrees of the Synod of *Dort* might have been sub-

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scribed by the Remonstrants, if there had been nothing in those Decrees, which either in express Words, or by plain Consequence, decided the five Articles.

The Author of *the Case* might therefore, according to the Light in which things appeared to him, in the highest Consistency with his being an honest Man, and zealous for the Liberties of his Country, appear so far in Defence of the Clause, as to endeavour to shew that, if it had passed, it would not have been subversive of those Liberties, and that it was wrong to raise such a Clamour against it, as if it tended to bring *irretrievable Ruin* upon us. And this will shew how little this Writer's Syllogism, p. 32, 33. though dressed out with so much Form in all the Pomp of Mood and Figure, is to the Purpose.

The Remarks that have been made might suffice to shew, that our Author has really left the main Argument of the Pamphlet which he undertook to confute, unanswered. If therefore he should be able to detect some smaller Mistakes of the Author of *the Case fairly stated*, it would very little affect the Merits of the Cause. But it will perhaps be found, that he has not succeeded very well in the other Parts of his Undertaking.

The Author of *the Case fairly stated* had said;
 “ The Clause was sent over by his Majesty, with
 “ the Advice of his Privy Council in *Great-Britain*:
 “ I say, by his Majesty: For to suppose, as some
 “ have insinuated, that he was such a Stranger to
 “ the Transactions of his Parliament, or of his Pri-
 “ vy Council, as not to know that such a Clause was
 “ sent over hither in his Name, or what it was,
 “ would be in my Opinion. to cast a great Reflecti-
 “ on on his Majesty's Wisdom and Attention to the
 “ Affairs of his Government.” The Occasion of
 this Observation was a Report which was confidently
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spread and propagated, that this whole Affair was transacted entirely without the King's knowing any thing of the Matter. What was offered in *the Case* seem'd to be very proper to shew the Absurdity of that Pretence. But our Author brings a very heavy Charge against that Writer on this Account. He represents it as a " wicked Attempt, and nearly
 " approaching to the highest Offence of the Law, to
 " go about to persuade the Public, that the Actions
 " of the Ministry are imputable to the Person of the
 " Prince." He charges him with the *utmost Degree of Ignorance*, and with an Insinuation the *obvious Tendency of which is grossly malignant*. He represents him as a Man " who is yet to be instructed in that
 " truly necessary and essential Principle, in regard to
 " the Administration of *Great-Britain*, that all that
 " is good is to be imputed to the Prince, and all
 " that is evil is to be charged, as far as the Nature
 " of the Thing will possibly permit, solely on his
 " Ministry." p. 7, 8. Here he takes it for granted, that the sending over the Clause was a very destructive Measure, and contained a manifest Invasion on the public Liberties. But this is what he has not yet proved, and is, to return him his own Expressions, *no better than a barefac'd and shameless begging of the very Question in Debate*. How ignorant soever he may suppose the Author of *the Case* to be, it happens that he in his superior Wisdom has informed him of nothing but what he was very well acquainted with before. He is not such a Stranger to the History and Constitution of his Country as he imagines him to be. He has long known, that it would be wrong to impute all the Actions of the Ministry personally to the Prince; or to interpret every Attack against the Ministers as a direct Attempt upon the Royal Authority. He knows that Ministers have often been in the wrong, and have led even Princes of good Intentions

tentions into very improper Measures ; and that in such Cases it is very consistent with Loyalty to the Prince to find Fault with and to oppose those Measures. But as Ministers have often been in the Wrong, so it is a Thing well known, that those that have opposed them have been also sometimes carried into undue Excesses ; and that out of Envy or Hatred to the Ministers, great Pains have been often taken to misrepresent and arraign the public Measures. And that when such Clamours have been rais'd to a great Height, and popular Discontents fomented, they have too often had an ill Effect in gradually alienating Men's Minds from the Prince upon the Throne, or at least diminishing their Zeal for the Government. If the People should once be brought to believe concerning any King of whom otherwise they had a good Opinion, that he placed the Administration in Hands resembling *Tyrconnel*, whom I am sorry to see mentioned on this Occasion, p. 85. might it not possibly have a Tendency to cool their Affections towards him.

One of the heaviest charges advanced against the Author of *the Case stated*, and which according to our Author's manner is most tragically exaggerated, relates to his misrepresenting the Author of the Remarks, and the Honourable Gentleman who writ the *Proceeding of the House of Commons vindicated*, as if they maintained not only that the House of Commons had a Right, but the sole Right of applying the unappropriated Surplus in the Treasury. But any one that impartially reads that part of *the Case* must be sensible, that the Intention of the Author was not to charge those Gentlemen, as having really and intentionally maintained that the Commons had the sole Right of applying the unappropriated Money ; as if this was their Principle. He only observed that the Argument they used, if it were to the
Purpose,

Purpose, looked that way. It is an allowed Maxim, that an Argument which proves too much proves nothing at all. The Intention was to shew that their Argument proved too much as they managed it. But he did not intend to charge it upon them as their real Opinion; that the Commons had the sole Right. And indeed this Supposition would have spoiled the Force of the Observation he had made, that their Argument proved *more than they themselves intended*. I know no Reason therefore why this Writer should cry out upon it as a *soul Insinuation*, and as a *complicated Offence against Candour and good Sense*, or should interpret it as an unworthy Reflection cast upon those Gentlemen, except it be a Reflection to suppose them capable of being mistaken in their Reasoning, or of making use of an Argument that proves too much, a Fault in Reasoning that very learned and able Men have been guilty of.

This Author had in his Remarks laid so mighty a Stress upon the Parliamentary Grant of two thousand Pounds to Sir Henry Tickbourn, that it is not to be wondered at, if he be loth to part with it. He pronounces, that it is a *truly legitimate and uncontestable Precedent*; and he calls the Author of *the Case's* Account of it a *singularly preposterous Attempt*. But whether it be preposterous or not must not be left to this Gentleman's Decision, who is too partial in his own Cause to be admitted as a proper Judge. It may be safely left to the judgment of the unprejudiced Reader, and if upon considering what is offered in *the Case*, he can be of Opinion that this Instance is at all to the Purpose in the present Argument, or that our Author has offered any thing to prove that it is so, no farther Pains will be here taken to undeceive him. But there is one thing that this Writer offers, which must not be passed by without some Notice. It had been proved, that in the Instance
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there referred to, the Crown could not with any Propriety have previously declared a Consent to that Grant, even supposing the King willing to have done so, because in the original Act by which the Hearth-money was granted to his Majesty, the Crown was expressly precluded from charging it with Gift, Grant or Pension. In answer to this our Author plainly asserts, " that the King *could spend the present Income* " arising from the Hearth-money in the same manner in which he spent the Profits of the Wards " and Liveries, in the Place of which this Tax was " granted to him." But he might have learned from the Author of the *Proceedings of the House of Commons vindicated*, for whom he professeth so great an Esteem, and who must certainly be allowed to be a much abler Judge in such Matters, that it was the Design of the Parliament in the Act relating to the Hearth-money to hinder the King from spending the Money arising from the Hearths, in the Manner in which he spent the Profits of the Wards and Liveries. This Writer goes on to ask the Author of *the Case*, " How could you conceive it possible, " that he *i. e.* the King, could be under any Restraint in regard to the Use, after he had " got the Money actually into his Coffers?" p. 52. So that all the Limitation he makes the King to be under, with Regard to the Disposal of the Money arising from the Hearths is, that he was not to give any thing out of it before he got it, but after he had once got it into his Coffers, he might dispose of it to what Uses he thought proper. We have here a Specimen of his Dexterity in applying his Rule of not judging of the Sense of an Act of Parliament, according to the Words of the Act. The Act of Parliament relating to the Hearth-money, says expressly, that no Sum or Sums of Money arising out of this Fund shall be given or granted by the King; but

but this Writer determines, that when once the Money came into the King's Coffers, he was under no Restraint, and might of his own Motion grant a Sum or Sums of Money, even so large a Sum as two thousand Pounds, out of the very Money arising out of that Fund. But this Gentleman should have considered, that if the King had been of his Opinion, and had thought he might notwithstanding the Act, and in direct Contradiction to it, of his own mere Motion, and without being empowered by a particular Clause in an Act of Parliament to do so, have made that Grant to Sir *Henry Tichbourn*, out of the Hearth-money, this would really have turned to Sir *Henry's* Disadvantage; since by the express Terms of the Act, he that should accept or receive any Sum or Sums of Money, from the King out of the Hearth-money, was liable to forfeit double the Sum he so received.

This Writer speaking of the Gentlemen, *who have been lately distinguished by Marks of Severity*, observes, that they were at least as able Servants, and are, and ever have been as loyal and zealous Subjects, as any who have been, or can be found to fill up their Places, p. 13. And he insinuates more than once, that the Author of the *Case stated*, had taken Pains to divest them of the Esteem of their Country. But whatever may be insinuated to the contrary, that Author was far from intending to cast Reflections upon the Abilities or Loyalty of those Gentlemen. Though he has not the Honour of a personal Acquaintance with any of them, he has from what he has heard of their Characters, a good Opinion both of their Abilities and of their Loyalty. For this Reason it gave him some Concern, when he heard of their Removal. But he is not among the Number of those who are for spreading Jealousies and Discontents against the Administration on that Account. Whatever Regard he

may have for those Gentlemen, he is not for confounding their particular Cause with that of the Public, and had much rather it should be thought that they had carried their Opposition in some Instances too far, than that under His Majesty's Government an Invasion had been made upon our essential Liberties. But it were to be wished, that they who are so tender of the Reputation of these Gentlemen, had also some Regard to the Characters of Gentlemen on the other Side, and that they would not give themselves such unrestrained License, in casting the bitterest Reproaches upon them, as having betrayed the Liberties of their Country. The Author of *the Case fairly stated*, declared, that he doubted not many of those who voted against the Clause, were acted by an honest Regard to the Interest of their Country. He does not retract that Acknowledgment. But he neither can carry his Complaisance so far as to believe that every Individual among them was acted purely by Patriot Views, and had no Mixture of other Considerations, nor can he think as this Writer seems to do, that all the worthy Men, and Friends to their Country, were wholly on one Side, and that all those on the other were deficient either in Understanding or in Honesty.

This Gentleman is pleased to charge the Author of the *Case* with having misrepresented the general Body of his Majesty's most faithful Subjects of this Kingdom, as if they were for complimenting their Representatives at the King's Expence. That Author has signified in very strong Terms, the Persuasion he had of the Loyalty of His Majesty's Subjects of *Ireland*. But he could not help expressing his Concern at some of the Addresses made by them to their Representatives. On this Occasion, he says, that, "However good their Intentions may have been, it was not well considered to do what may have

" have an Appearance of complimenting those Gentlemen at the King's Expence." It is left to the Judgment of the Reader, whether this is not expressed with a decent Regard to them. The Goodness of their Intentions is not arraigned, but the Prudence of their Conduct. And he is still of Opinion that some of those Addresses might have that Appearance, and were therefore highly improper; since they contained plain Insinuations that the fundamental Liberties of this Kingdom had been struck at, and that they had been on the Brink of *irretrievable Ruin*, by a Clause sent over from his Majesty with the Advice of his Privy-Council in *Great-Britain*.

The Author of *the Case fairly stated*, had declared that he did not pretend to an absolute Certainty, but had followed what appeared to him most probable. For this Reason his Answerer has pronounced him unqualified to write upon this Subject, and thus has endeavoured to turn his Modesty to his Disadvantage. It is not to be wonder'd at, that this Gentleman does not approve of a Way of Writing so different from his own. But this he may be sure of, that none of his Readers will ever charge him with an Excess of Modesty or Self-diffidence. There does not appear in his Writings so much as a Suspicion of its being possible for him to be mistaken in these Matters. He all along speaks with as positive an Air as if he sat in the infallible Chair, and had a Right to pass a decisive Judgment upon all those that differ from him, as Persons either of weak Heads or dishonest Hearts.

Little Notice has been hitherto taken of the Abuse cast by this Writer, upon the Author of *the Case*. When an Author has not put his Name to his Work, probably with a View to avoid every thing personal,

it is not a very usual Thing for his Answerer to address him particularly, and as it were by Name. But since he has taken the Liberty to do so, and has thought fit so plainly to point him out to the World, he ought to have treated him with some Regard to good Manners and Decency. It would have been prudent in him to have done so, even for his own Sake. Whatever Superiority of Talents he is possessed of, or may think himself possessed of, he ought certainly to make some charitable Allowances, for those that have the Misfortune to differ from him in their Sentiments. In political as well as religious Matters, honest and sensible Men may see Things in very different Lights, but should not for that Reason treat one another, as if they were either Knaves or Fools. It would be a very disagreeable Employment to enter upon a distinct Discussion of the several Passages of this Nature, with which this Pamphlet abounds. But without making particular Reflections upon them, it may not be improper to lay some of them before the Reader as a Specimen of the Temper and Genius of this Writer.

He represents the Author of the Case as having *thrust himself into this Controversy without acquainting himself either with the Text or Margin of the real Subject in Debate*, p. 5. He charges him with *the utmost degree of Ignorance*, p. 10. and parallels him with a *modern self sufficient Dutch or German Divine, affecting Moderation*, that should advance a Scheme, which, as he puts the Case, could hardly enter into the Head of any Man that was in his Senses, p. 6. But it were well if Folly and Impertinence were the worst Part of the Charge he has thought fit to bring against him. He has given many broad Insinuations against the Morality of his Conduct. He sets out in his very Title Page, with a Charge upon him of *Craft, of Falshood and Sophistry*. He represents

sents him as having engaged in a Cause *utterly repugnant to his known Principles* : and expressly charges him, as well as the Author of the *Considerations*, as having advanced nothing but *Falsbood and Sophistry, and Doctrines manifestly subversive of all Liberty?* p. 7. He all along supposes him to have acted contrary to the Principles he formerly maintained, and which are still really his Principles ; and that *if he will but be true to himself, and to the Character of an honest Man, he must instantly become an avowed and zealous Convert to the Cause of his Country*, p. 11. A plain Insinuation this, as if at present he did not act up to the Character of an honest Man, and of a Friend to his Country. He undertakes to expostulate with him, in regard not only to the *Wisdom*, but the *Morality of the Part he has acted*, p. 12. He calls upon him to explain *upon what honest Principle it was that he has been prevailed upon to act as he has done* ; and that it will be *incumbent upon him to explain how either his Head or his Heart could permit him to attempt to put so gross a delusion upon the Publick*. He expressly charges him with *suffering something else than Righteousness and Truth to have the controuling direction of the Powers of his Mind*—And talks of his *Connection and Communication with such Politicks and their Authors, as have already had a baleful influence on his Sense, and on his simplicity of Spirit*, p. 24. That *evil Communications have effectually had this Operation in his Case to pervert sound Sense as well as corrupt good Manners*, p. 25. That *nothing less than Repentance and Conversion can procure such a complicated Offence against Candor and good Sense, as he has been guilty of, to be blotted out*, p. 50. He supposes the Author of the Case may possibly think a thing consistent with *Orthodox Divinity, that is wholly repugnant to the first principles of Morals*, p. 50. and that there is so much folly mixed with the
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little Conceits of a pettifogging Attorney in what he has written, that his old Acquaintance cannot help suspecting that by a very undue Influence he has been betray'd into Measures, where it has been impossible for him to take one Step without doing dishonour to the Powers of his Understanding, or to the Qualities of his Heart, p. 53. Other Passages might be produced to the same Purpose; but the Reader will probably think these sufficient. And indeed whosoever will give himself the Trouble to peruse this Pamphlet, will easily perceive, that the Design of it, so far as relates to the Author of the Case, is to charge him as being deficient either in Understanding or Honesty, in the Soundness of the Head or the Integrity of the Heart. As to the former Part of the Charge, it will give that Author little Concern. If the Powers of his Reason be impair'd, it is what he ought to be pitied for and not blam'd; since this must be his Misfortune, not his Crime. But he would not be quite so easy under an Attack against his moral Character, since this cannot be admitted without charging him with a want of that Sincerity of Heart, which, in his Opinion, is really much more valuable than the most sagacious Understanding, and brightest Parts, can be without it. If he were such a Person as this Writer is pleased to represent him, he would certainly be very little qualified to appear as he has done, in Defence of the noblest Cause in the World, the Cause of Christianity and the Holy Scriptures. But who gave this Man a Commission to judge of the Qualities of the Heart? Where did he learn to erect himself into a Judge, and to take the Prerogative of the Almighty out of his Hands? Or, does he think that it is impossible for any Man that differs from him in the present Question, to be at once an honest Man, and a Man of Sense? It is however, a Satisfaction to the Person, against whom these Reflections are levell'd, that he

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can approve himself to his own Mind ; that he is conscious to the Uprightness of his own Intentions ; and that he was under no *undue Influence* from any Persons whatsoever, and is an utter Stranger to those *Connections* and *Communications*, which this Writer has been pleased to insinuate. Nor was he ever directly or indirectly put upon engaging in this Cause by the Court, or any one belonging to it. His sole Aim was to serve the real Interests of his King and Country, by doing his Part towards allaying the unnatural Ferment raised in the Spirits of the People, and the Jealousies and Discontents, which have been so industriously propagated, and which in his Opinion, might have a pernicious Tendency. That these and no other were his Views, he can safely appeal to him, who alone can judge the Heart : And it is his Comfort, that his State is not to be determined, by what rash and fallible Men, in the Peevishness of their Spirits, or the Power of their Prejudices, may pronounce concerning him. This Gentleman has done the Author of *the Case*, the Honour to call him more than once his *old Acquaintance*. The World must judge whether he has treated him in a Manner becoming that Character. They that intimately know the Person, whom he has thought fit to asperse, will not think it too assuming in him to declare, that he is not afraid of the strictest Enquiry that can be made by any Man, into his past Life and Character from his earliest Youth, to this Day. His Temper and Conduct has been such, that he has nothing to apprehend from what either open Enemies, if he has any, or passionate Men who may call themselves his Friends, can with Truth say against him. All the Return he makes to this Gentleman for his Insinuations is most sincerely to wish him a greater Degree of Candour, and a more equal Temper of Mind. It has really given him a

sensible Concern, to see a Person, who has otherwise good Qualities, carried away so far by his Prejudices and Passions, as to write in a Manner so little reconcilable to the Rules of good Breeding, or of Christian Charity. His first Resolution upon reading that Pamphlet was not to answer a Man who had so little Government of his Temper: And the only Thing which afterwards determined him to take Notice of it at all, was the open Attempt that was made upon his moral Character. But having taken this Occasion to justify the Honesty of his Intentions, he now publicly declares, that nothing shall ever provoke him to engage any farther in this Controversy, either against this Writer, or any other Person whatsoever. And he will think himself happy, if free from the Noise and Rage of Party Contests, he can pass the remainder of his Days, which he has no reason to think can be long, in Services, which if they answer his Intention, may possibly be of some use to Religion and its sacred Interests.

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